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Abstract 
We attempt to develop a system dynamics model that describes exploitations in 
Thailand fishing industry. We make an extension on the original fish bank model by Saeed 
et al (2018) to further elaborate on the structure for exploited labor. After we simulate the 
developed model with information about Thailand fishing industry in 2016-2018, the result 
suggests that Thailand should maintain the current level of inspection effectiveness, but 
should reduce bust costs for having illegal fishing vessel and exploited labor to maintain 
fishing activities in Thailand. Then, we create the application to play this new fish bank 
game that includes exploited labor based on our extended model. 
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Introduction 
Thailand is well-known as the third-largest seafood exporter in the world. However, in 
April 2015, the European Union gave Thailand a “yellow card” caution and listed it among 
countries that have insufficient action of progress in tackling illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing (IUU), which is the international law (Holland, 2019). If Thai government does not take 
full action to overcome the IUU Fishing issue, the European Union will give it a “red card”, 
which would ban the export of all seafood-products from the Thai fishing industry to the 
European Union. In the overall picture, Thailand will lose approximately a hundred billion Baht 
of export value, and its entire fishery occupation system will experience a crisis. 
To respond to the yellow card, the government of Thailand has strengthened law 
enforcement to control, patrol, and track activities in the national fishing fleet. First, Thai Port 
Authority has increased the seriousness of ship inspections, which drove fishermen to register 
their ships into the tracking system. Second, employers who hire foreigners/immigrants without 
work authorization will be forced to pay a penalty of 10,000-100,000 Baht for each hired alien. 
The detected aliens will be sent back to their countries and will be prohibited to work in Thailand 
for 2 years. Repeated offenses will lead to imprisonment for no more than 1 year or the bust cost 
of 50,000-200,000 Baht (Thairath, 2018). The legislation has shown an effort of the government 
of Thailand and the improvement of anti-human trafficking. On 8th January 2019, the European 
Union announced the recantation of the yellow card of the Thai fishing sector in order to show 
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the acceptance of the progress of solving the illegal fishing problems, but lack of reporting, and 
uncontrolled (IUU) of Thailand have continued 
Also, even though the Thai fishing sector has met the international standard, a new 
problem has arisen. Since the penalty of having illegal labor from the mentioned legislation is 
very high, it has led to fishing labor shortage, which has raised cost of fishing, making it less 
competitive in the export market. 
Objective 
Our first goal for this IQP is to extend the system dynamics model of “Illegal Fishing and 
Trafficked Labor” created by Saeed et al (2018) and use this model to explore policies to help the 
Thai Government so it can meet the conflicting goals of reducing labor exploitation while still 
maintaining competitiveness of its fishing industry. The second goal is to create a gaming 
interface based on the extended version of system dynamics model that we will call “Fishy 
Banks” which can be used as a teaching or training tool for students, regulators, and law 
enforcement personnel. The player will have a role as Port Authority which takes responsibilities 
to control fishing activities. Through this game play, the players will gradually understand the 
complexity and policy resilience of the system as they have to make repetitive decisions to deal 
with the evolving situations arising from those decisions. 
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Boundary 
Our project focuses on studying the illegal fishing and trafficked labor of the fishing 
industry in Thailand by developing a model based on the original of Saeed et. al (2018). We 
simulate the fishing industry in the model by disturbing the equilibrium. 
and observing the trend of trafficked labor. We, then, apply several policies and observe 
their effects on trafficked labor and fishing industry. We seek to replicate the results from Thai 
government policies from 2015-2019. Our model will focus on the regulation of trafficked labor 
involving the implemented policies in the model. Other factors that may affect the trafficked 
labor but are not related to the implemented policies, such as corruption, are outside of the scope 
of our study. 
 ​Part I. Literature Review 
- What Is IUU Fishing? 
IUU Fishing stands for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. It is the 
international regulation that captures a variety of fishing activities, which are conducted against 
legal conservation and management measures. IUU Fishing is established to control the capacity 
of vessels to catch fish, such that fish stock and other marine wildlife remain in a sustainable 
state (Fisheries - European Commission, 2017). 
The term “Illegal fishing” means fishing without permission or against the law of fishery 
they belong to, for example, sending vessels to other state's waters without permission, catching 
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too many fish, and fisheries that violate international commitments related to the Regional 
Fishery Management Organization (RFMO), “Unreported fishing” is fishing that has not been 
reported or has been delusively reported, and “Unregulated fishing” is fishing done by vessels 
without nationality or a valid license (Konrad, 2018). 
Countries that do not take sufficient actions to follow the IUU regulation will be given a 
“yellow card” caution. After receiving a yellow card, if the countries still do not improve their 
performances in control and inspection of fishing vessels, they will be given a “red card” and 
will be prohibited from exporting seafood products to the EU. 
Even though IUU Fishing does not directly focus on exploitation in fishing industries, it 
is tacitly related to human-trafficking, because weak inspections and policies lead to an increase 
of unlicensed vessels and exploited labor in vessels. Therefore, control of IUU Fishing will 
influence the reduction of human trafficking as well.  
- Original Model 
In the International Conference on Governance, Crime, and Justice Statistics, Saeed4th  
et. al (2018) presented a System Dynamics (SD) model which explains the situations of illegal 
fishing and trafficked labor. Their presentation was titled: ​A System Dynamics approach to 
Illegal Fishing and Trafficked Labor​. It examined policies to address the intersection of 
prosperity and exploitation. This model can be organized into 6 interacting modules, which are 
Boats, Fish Yield, Fish Availability, Slaves, Liquidity, and Prices. Figure 1 shows the 
relationships between the modules of the model. 
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Figure 1.​ Interacting modules in Saeed et. al (2018) model 
Considering the negative feedback loop of Fish Availability and Prices in the right side of 
Figure 1, as the quantity of fish in the market increases, fish price will decrease, while as the fish 
price increases, the fishing industry invests more in boats and eventually fish availability in the 
market will also increase. These interactions follow the basic principle of demand and supply in 
economics (Principles of Microeconomics 2e, 2011). This feedback loop tends toward 
equilibrium or stability. On the left side, there are also 2 negative feedback loops connecting 
Liquidity and Boats and Liquidity and Slaves, which simultaneously introduces other controlling 
processes. When liquidity increases, fishermen have money to buy more ships. On the other 
hand, if the liquidity decreases, fishermen find the cheaper alternative of investing in more slave 
labor. There is however a hidden growth process (positive feedback loop); as the number of 
vessels in the system rises, the fish population goes down, causing the reduction in fish 
availability in the market, which will increase prices and amplify the action of controlling loops. 
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Figure 2.​ Exploited labors as a function of time from Saeed model (2018) 
Figure 2 compares the impact of different policies in the model of Figure 1. It 
demonstrates that increased policing is the most effective action to reduce exploited labor in the 
fishing sector, although its cost would be high, while it may also increase the scope of corrupt 
practices if they exist 
Model  Modifications 
 The labor and other operating costs are aggregated in the model of Figure 1, which we 
modified. Operating cost is divided into legal labor cost and fuel cost, so having exploited labor 
decreases the labor cost. However, fishermen still have to pay for fuel cost regardless of the 
exploited labor. 
We also refined the logic of acts of intervention by the authority. There are 3 policies that 
authority in this model will consider. 1) Awareness policy will decrease the unaware vulnerable 
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workers that would be lured to become exploited labor. This policy will decrease the inflow of 
exploited labor. 2) Inspection policy will increase the average amount of exploited labor that was 
found and busted in the inspection, increasing the outflow of exploited labor. 3) The 
rehabilitation policy will increase the rehabilitation rate of vulnerable workers, increasing the 
outflow of vulnerable workers which will indirectly decrease the inflow of stock labor. 
We found that one of the flaws in Thai policies that lead to the yellow card is the 
insufficient budget, so we design the model to reflect that. The authority has to distribute their 
limited budget to the 3 policies, determining their effectiveness. However, the effectiveness of 
these policies is not solely defined by budget. Awareness policy will be less effective when the 
vulnerable workers increase, and Inspection policy will be less effective when the total number 
of ships increases. 
We also found that one of the responses of the Thai government on the yellow card was 
to create a stricter policy about licensing the ships. So, we made the distinction between licensed 
and unlicensed ships. We assumed that licensed ships would be easier to inspect by the authority, 
and would thus have a higher chance of being busted. This seems to be only disadvantageous for 
fishermen, but it is a necessary cost for registered licensed ships because there will be an 
additional unlicensed bust cost when the unlicensed ships are inspected and busted. This 
unlicensed bust cost will affect the fishermen’s decision to register the ships, when the bust cost 
is increased, they will want to register more ships. 
Several factors affect the investment decision. First, the profitability: when fishermen are 
making a profit, they would want to invest more in ships to enlarge their business. On the other 
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hand, if they are running losses, they would invest in exploited labor to decrease the upkeep cost 
instead. Second, the ratio of licensed ships: since there is a higher chance of licensed ships to be 
busted, the higher ratio of licensed ships will lead to a lower investment in exploited labor and 
vice versa. Third, price of exploited labor: higher price of exploited labor will lead to lower 
demand for exploited labor. Last, the bust cost: when bust cost rises, fishermen will want to 
decrease the risk by decreasing the investment in exploited labor. 
Since the calculation of upkeep is independent of the Funds stock, we created a Debt 
stock to track liabilities in the face of inflexible upkeep costs. When the Funds fall below the 
desire funds, there will be a limit on how much funds will be paid for the upkeep. Since only a 
fraction of the upkeep is paid, the rest becomes a debt that the fishermen will have to pay back 
only when they are making a profit. 
We used the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) report to 
formulate a basis for some of our initial conditions. according to the summaries for Asia reported 
for 2016, there were about 10 workers on each fishing vessel on average, and the amount of 
exploited labor among them was 30%. Based on Pacharat (2018), there were a total of around 
13,000 Thai ships in the 2016 record and around 10,000 ships were licensed in 2018. Including 
some number of ships that were not in the record which would not have licenses, we assume that the 
ratio of licensed to unlicensed ships is 10:5. 
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Model Description 
We will begin this section by describing the overview of our extended model through 
feedback loops and explain the relationship between sectors. After that, we will explain the 
details of the model structure and variables in each sector.  
- Feedback Loops 
 
Figure 3.​ Feedback Loops of the extended model 
Our model consists of 11 modules: Ships, Fish Yield, Fish Availability, Fish Price, 
Liquidity, Investment, Upkeep, Exploited Labor, Exploited Labor Prices, Policies, and Budget. 
These modules are interconnected, creating feedback loops as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.1.​ Feedback Loop of Fish Availability and Fish Prices 
The negative feedback loop in Figure 3.1 shows that as fish availability increases, fish 
prices go down due to high fish inventory and low fish demand, causing the reduction of fish 
sale, which will lead to the declining fish prices. As fish prices decrease, fish demand goes up, 
which will lead to less fish availability in the market. 
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Figure 3.2.​ Feedback Loop of Investment and Liquidity 
Figure 3.2 shows that high liquidity will encourage fishermen to have more investments 
because they have more funds. A direct link from investment to liquidity tells us that variations 
of investment are related to the calculation of liquidity. However, increase in investment does not 
show that liquidity will decrease or will increase because liquidity also depends on debt paid, 
which determines the quantity of liquidity. 
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Figure 3.3.​ Feedback Loop of Ships and Investment 
The increase of investment will motivate fishermen to buy more ships. However, the 
changes in ships do not directly affect the investment, but affect exploited labor investment, 
which is a part of the investment module.  
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Figure 3.4.​ Feedback Loop of Ships and Upkeep 
A direct link from Upkeep to Ships in Figure 3.4 shows that unlicensed ship busts in the 
upkeep module affect ship registration. If unlicensed-bust cost is high, then vessels will be 
registered more. However, upkeep does not affect the chances of numbers of fishing boats in the 
system. A positive direct link [18] from Ships to Upkeep shows that more ships will lead to 
higher upkeep because fishermen must pay for fuel and ship registration costs. 
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Figure 3.5.​ Feedback Loop of Ships, Upkeep, and Investment 
As mentioned in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, an increase in investment leads to more ships, and 
more ships will raise the upkeep. Then, variations of exploited labor bust cost in the upkeep 
module affect the new exploited labor investment, which is a part of the investment module. 
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Figure 3.6.​ Feedback Loop of Labor Prices and Labors 
Figure 3.6 illustrates that while the amount of exploited labor in the system is rising, the 
new forced labor demand declines, causing the reduction in exploited labor prices. After that, as 
the price of exploited labor decreases, the demand for labor will increase, causing the expansion 
of exploited labor. 
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Figure 3.7.​ Feedback Loop of Labor prices, Labors, and Investment 
According to Figure 3.7, a negative direct link [10] from Investment to Labor shows that 
when the investment decreases, fishermen buy more exploited labors instead of purchasing new 
ships. With the decrease in exploited labor, the new forced labor demand increases to cause the 
reduction of exploited labor prices. However, the change in labor prices does not directly affect 
the investment, but affects exploited labor investment, which is a fraction of the investment 
module. 
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Figure 3.8.​ Feedback Loop of Labor, Upkeep, and Investment 
Reduction in investment leads to more exploited labor purchases. Then, more exploited 
labor leads to less upkeep costs since the upkeep spent on legal labors is reduced by replacing 
them with illegal labors. 
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Figure 3.9.​ Feedback Loop of Policies, Upkeep, and ships 
A negative direct link from Ships to Policies shows that more vessels will lead to lower 
ship inspection effectiveness. The decreased policing will make fishermen have lower upkeep 
costs since they have less chance to be inspected. 
 
19 
Figure 3.10.​ Feedback Loop of the Dynamical Behavior Variation. 
A negative arrow from Ships to Fish Yield shows that rising numbers of fishing vessels 
will lead to the reduction of fish populations. This trend is seen because more ships will lead to 
more catch, which makes the fish hatch rate smaller than the summation of the fish death rate and 
total catch fish, causing a reduction in fish stock. The less fish in the sea available, the less fish 
availability in the market, and the higher the fish prices. As fish prices increase, fishermen have 
more funds and less debt, which will lead to more liquidity. More liquidity causes more 
investment, which will lead to the increase in number of ships. 
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Figure 3.11​ Feedback Loop of Ships and Fish Yield 
Figure 3.11 describes a negative feedback loop between Ships and Fish Yield sectors. If 
the amounts of ships increase, the amount of fish in the sea will be reduced, which leads to the 
reduction in fishing ships.  
 
  
21 
- Fish Yield Module 
 
Figure 4.​ Fish Yield Module 
The Fish Yield module describes the variation of the fish population, i.e. fish is moved 
out of the stock by Fish Death Rate and Total Catch flows, and fish is added to the stock by the 
Fish Hatch Rate flow. The equations of stock and each flow connected  to it are written as:
                                            (1)ish (F ish Hatch Rate ish Death Rate otal Catch) dtF = ∫
 
 
− F − T
                    (1.1)ish Hatch Rate F ish rac Hatch rate) f fect of  Density on HatchingF = ( * F * E
                  (1.2)ish Death Rate F ish rac Death rate) f fect of  Density on Death rateF = ( * F * E
                                                                       (1.3)otal Catch Catch per Ship hips to Sea)T = ( * S  
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Figure 5.​ Effect of Density on Hatching as a Function of Fish Relative Density 
The graph in Figure 5 illustrates that when there are a few fish in the sea, the hatching 
rate is small. When the fish population increases, the hatching rate will be increased. However, 
the hatching rate will be decreased at some point even though fish density is still increasing 
because there are limited sources, such that the fish population cannot be higher than numbers of 
fish at equilibrium. 
 
Figure 6.​ Effect of Density on Death Rate as a Function of Fish Relative Density 
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The graph in Figure 6 shows that death rate increases slowly at first, then increases 
exponentially at the middle phase, and increases in a negative acceleration until there is no 
change in death rate, in other words, the fish is at equilibrium. This type of graph is called a 
S-Shaped Growth Curve or Logistic Curve, which is widely used in biological systems to explain 
population changes. 
 
Figure 7.​ Effect of Density on Catch as a Function of Fish Relative Density 
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- Fish Availability Module 
 
Figure 8.​ Fish Availability Module 
This module consists of two stocks representing Fish Inventory and Average Sale. Where, 
                                                                        (2)ish Inventory (F ish Catch ish Sale)dtF = ∫
 
 
− F
                                                                                                      (2.1)ish Catch otal CatchF = T
ish Sale Normal F ish Demand ish Demand Elasticity nventory Limit)F = ( * F * I
                                                                    (2.2)ish Demand Noise RANDOM (− , 5, ))+ F * ( 5  5  
From equation (2.2), fish sale depends on fish demand elasticity and inventory limit 
whereas Fish Demand Noise is just small random numbers, which are generated by 
RANDOM(<min>, <max>, [<seed>]). Noise will not affect any trends in the model but will lead 
to small oscillations over simulation time. Therefore, fish sale can be decreased because of 
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decreased fish demand or declined fish inventory. The details of Fish Demand Elasticity and 
Inventory Limit converters are described by Figures 9 and 10 respectively. 
Now let us consider Average Sale stock. Here, we notice that only the Change in Average Sale 
flow affects a movement of this stock. The equations of the stock and flow are represented as
                                                                           (3)verage Sale hange in Average Sale dtA = ∫
 
 
C  
                                                  (3.1)hange in Average Sale F ish_Sale verage_Sale)/2C = ( − A  
Average Sale stock will influence Inventory Goal, which represents the production of 
Inventory Coverage and Average Sale. After that, the inventory goal will be used to determine 
Inventory Limit. 
 
Figure 9.​ Fish Demand Elasticity as a function of Effective Fish Price Index 
According to Figure 9, we know that fish demand decreases when fish price increases, so 
we assume that fish demand elasticity decreases exponentially. Considering the horizontal axis, 
at the point that Effective Fish Price Index is equal to 4, we must set Fish Demand Elasticity to 
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be zero because we do not want fish price to be unrealistically high when there are almost no fish 
in the sea. 
 
Figure 10.​ Effect of Fish Inventory and Inventory Goal on Inventory Limit 
Since we assume that the inventory upper limit is 1, such that even the ratio of Fish 
Inventory and Inventory Goal is greater than 1, fish sale does not rise up unrealistically high.  
- Fish Prices Module 
 
Figure 11.​ Fish Prices Module  
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In this module, we calculate Fish Price Index stock based on Fish Inventory and 
Inventory Goal from the Fish Availability module. After that, Change in Fish Price flow will lead 
to the Fish Price Index stock. 
                                                              (4)ish P rice Index (Change In F ish P rice) dtF = ∫
 
 
                              (4.1)hange in F ish P rice ish P rice Index ish P rice ElasticityC = F × F  
 After obtaining the Fish Price Index, it will be used to calculate the fish price by the 
equations below. 
              (4.2)f fective F ish P rice Index ish P rice Index 1 onsumer T ax rate)E = F × ( + C
                                (4.3)ish P rice f fective F ish P rice Index ormal F ish P rice F = E × N   
The first equation involves consumer tax rate, in which we set its default to be zero for the utility 
of equilibrium calculation. This value is changeable based on government legislation. Then, the 
second equation shows how to calculate fish price. Finally, the revenue of fishermen will be 
calculated by fish sale and fish price as shown below. 
                                                                             (4.4)evenue ish Sale ish P riceR = F * F  
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Figure 12.​ Effect of Fish Inventory and Inventory Goal on Fish Price Elasticity 
From Figure 12, we assume that the fish price elasticity decreases exponentially as 
increases. However, if is bigger than 5, we would set the fish priceF ish InvetoryInventory Goal
F ish Invetory
Inventory Goal  
elasticity to be -0.5 such that when the number of fish in the fish inventory is high, fish sale price 
will not be too low.  
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- Ships Module 
 
Figure 13.​ Ships Module 
Unlike the Saeed model (2018), now we include Licensed Ships and Unlicensed Ships Stocks 
into the model such that we could replicate performances of the port authority of Thailand. The 
total ships in the system are equal to the summation of licensed and unlicensed vessels. Let us 
consider the Unlicensed Ships stock.
       (5)nlicensed Ships (Ship P roduction hip Contract Ended hip Registration) dtU = ∫
 
 
+ S − S  
There are two inflows and one outflow, which are Ship Production, Contract Ended, and Ship 
Registration respectively. The equations of each flow are described as follows:
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                              (5.1)hip P roduction ELAY 3( , Ship P roduction Delay)S = D Ship P rice
Ship Investment  
                                                                    (5.2)hip Contract EndedS = Licensed ShipsAv Length of  Ship Contract
      (5.3)hip Registration f fect of  Bust Cost ormal Regis Rate nlicensed ShipsS = E × N × U  
Since there is a delay in ship production, we then use in the first equation,ELAY 3D  
which is a third-order ​material delay of new ship orders.​ The equations above show that new 
vessels will be added to the Unlicensed Ships stock. In addition, licensed contract ended ships 
are also moved to the unlicensed stock. In order to reduce numbers of unlicensed ships in the 
stock, fishermen must register those ships for licenses. Now considering the Licensed Ships 
stock, Ship Registration is inflow and Ship Contract Ended is outflow as shown in figure 13.
                                    (6)icensed Ships (Ship Registration hip Contract Ended) dtL = ∫
 
 
− S  
 
Figure 14.​ Effect of Bust Cost on Registration vs. Relative Unlicensed Bust Cost 
 In this model, the amount of new licensed ships depend on the bust cost of unlicensed 
ships. Thus, we use the fact that increasing bust cost will lead to more ship registrations. In 
Figure 14, we assume that the growth of the Effect of Bust Cost on Registration follows the 
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logistic growth curve. Where the parameter in x-axis is calculated from
.elative Unlicensed Bust CostR = Unlicensed Bust CostAv Unlicensed Bust Cost  
 
Figure 15.​ Effect of Catch on Ship Harboring 
Figure 15 tells us that if Catch_per_Ship/Normal_Catch_per_Ship is 1, fishermen will 
send all of their ships to sea because they can catch fish at their maximum capacity (i.e. 
Normal_Catch_per_Ship = 20). That means as the ratio of  Catch_per_Ship and 
Normal_Catch_per_Ship approaches zero, fishermen will send less ships to sea in order to reduce 
operational costs. 
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- Labor Module 
 
Figure 16.​ Labor Module 
 This module explains variations of labors in the dynamics system. It consists of two 
stocks. The first stock is Exploited Labors and the second stock is Vulnerable Workers. 
Considering the Exploited Labors stock, there is one inflow and two outflows. Exploited Labors 
are flowed in from the Vulnerable Workers stock by the Lure flow.
                                        (7)xploited Labors (Lure ttrition eleased Labors) dt E = ∫
 
 
− A − R  
ure naware V ulnerable ormal Lure Rate elative Labor DemandL = U × N × R  
                                                                        (7.1)f fect of  Exploitation Ratio on Lure× E  
Where, 
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      (7.1.1)naware V ulnerable ulnerable f fect of  Unawareness on V ulnerableU = V × E  
● f fect of  Unawareness on V ulnerable wareness P olicy EffectivenessE = 1 − A  
        (7.1.2)elative Labor Demand xploited Labor Demand/Normal Labor DemandR = E  
● xploited Labor DemandE = Exploited Labor InvestmentExploited Labor P rice Index  Exploited Labor Normal Cost*  
is described by a graphical relationship as a function off fect of  Exploitation Ratio on LureE  
Relative Exploitation Ratio seen in Figure 16, in which 
● elative Exploitation RatioR = Exploited LaborsLabor Capacity  Normal Exploitation Ratio*  
● abor Capacity hips to Sea abor Capacity per ShipL = S * L  
 
Figure 17.​ Effect of Exploitation Ratio on Lure as a Function of Relative Exploitation Ratio 
The Exploited Labors stock flows back to Vulnerable Workers stock through the 
Released Labors flow. The other outflow is the Attrition flow that flows out of the model. 
                                                                        (7.2)ttrition rac Attrition xploited LaborsA = F * E  
  (7.3)eleased Labors abors Released form Contract Ended abors Released f rom BustR = L + L  
Where,  
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      (7.3.1)abors Released f rom Bust xploited LaborsL = Ships to Sea
Licensed Ships Busted+Unlicensed Ships Busted
* E  
  (7.3.2)abors Released form Contract Ended xploited Labors/Av Length Labor ContractL = E  
Now let us consider the Vulnerable Workers stock, where there are two inflows and two 
outflows, in which Lure outflow and Released Labors inflow are described in Exploited Labors 
stock. The other flows are Vulnerable Entry flow from outside of the model and Rehabilitated 
flow out of the model. Their equations are expressed as 
                    V ulnerable W orkers (Released Labors ulnerable Entry = ∫
 
 
+ V  
                                                             (8)                                      ure ehabilitated) dt − L − R  
                        (8.1)ulnerable Entry ormal V ulnerable Entry ulnerable AttractionV = N * V
         (8.2)ehabilitated ormal F rac Rehab ulnerable ehab P olicy EffectivenessR = N * V * R  
- Labor Prices Module 
 
Figure 18.​ Labor Prices Module 
This module calculates Exploited Labor Price Index, which determines vulnerable 
attraction. Similar to the Fish Price Index, the Change in Labor Price flow directs to the stock. 
The equations of the stock and flow are written as
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                                          (9)xploited Labor P rice Index (Change in Labor P rice) dtE = ∫
 
 
hange in Labor P rice f fect of  Demand on Labor P riceC = E  
                                                                            (9.1)        xploited Labor P rice Index × E  
 
Figure 19.​ Effect of Demand on Labor Price as a function of Relative Labor Demand 
Based on an economic principle of price-demand, as labor quantity demand increases, 
labor price also increases. Thus, we assume that the growth of the Effect of Demand on Labor 
Price follows the logistic curve such that when the demand is very low, the price would not be 
too high. Similarly, if the demand is very high, the price would not be too low. 
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- Liquidity Module 
 
Figure 20.​ Liquidity Module 
 In this module, there are three stocks, which are Average Expenditures, Funds, and Debt 
stocks. The Average Expenditures stock tells us an average of how much fishermen spend on 
upkeep and investments. Thus, there is one inflow, which is a change in average expenditure. 
The equations of the stock and flow are, 
                                                         (10)verage Expenditures (Change in av Exp) dtA = ∫
 
 
                                             (10.1)hange in av ExpC = 2
(Upkeep+Investments)−Average Expenditures  
Then the Average Expenditures stock is used to calculate desired funds, which will be used to 
determine the amount of upkeep that fishermen can pay.  
                                    (10.2)esired F unds verage Expenditures und CoverageD = A * F  
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Figure 21.​ Effect of Funds/Desired Funds on Funds Limit 
Figure 21 assumes that if the ratio of Funds and Desired Funds is greater than or equal to 
0.2, Funds Limit will be 1. Funds Limit varies from 0 to 1, following the trend line in the graph. 
The Funds stock consists of one inflow and three outflows. Looking at the inflow, funds 
is added by the Net Revenue flow (after paying taxes) from fishing. 
                                  (11)und (Net Revenue nvestments pkeep ebt paid) dtF = ∫
 
 
− I − U − D
                                                   (11.1)et Revenue evenue 1 roducer T ax rate)N = R * ( − P  
Now let us consider expenditures or outflows. Fishermen have to pay for upkeep and 
spend on investments. Besides, they must pay for their debt if their total upkeep is greater than 
paid upkeep. The equations of these outflows are shown below. 
(from ship and traffick labor)                                (11.2)nvestments otal investmentsI = T  
                                                                                             (11.3)pkeep pkeep paidU = U  
                                                                                               (11.4)ebt paid aymentD = P  
Where, pkeep paid otal Upkeep unds LimitU = T * F  
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 Debt stock contains two inflows and one outflow, which are Borrow, Interest, and 
Payment flows respectively. The equations of these flows are represented below.
                                                                (12)ebt (Borrow nterest ayment) dtD = ∫
 
 
+ I − P
                                                                (12.1)orrow otal Upkeep pkeep P aidB = T − U
                                                                                (12.2)nterest ebt nterest RateI = D * I
                                  (12.3)ayment MT H1(Debt unds Limit, P ayment Delay)P = S * F   
- Investment Module 
 
Figure 22.​ Investment Module 
In our model, investment is distributed into two portions. First is exploited labor 
investment and second is ship investment. This module revolves around how much of the 
fraction of the funds should be invested in exploited labor, and the rest will be invested in the 
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ship. Four factors affect the fraction of funds invested in exploited labor: funds, unlicensed ships 
ratio, exploited labor price, and labor bust cost. 
 
Figure 23.​ Effect of Unlicensed Ships Ratio on Exploited Labor Investment 
From Figure 23, we apply the idea that more unlicensed ships will lead to more exploited labor 
investment.  
 
Figure 24.​ Effect of Exploited Labor Price on Exploited Labor Investment 
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As exploited labor price increases, the demand for illegal labor decreases, which leads to lower 
exploited labor investment. 
 
Figure 25.​ Effect of Exploited Labor Bust Cost on Labor Investment 
Figure 25 shows that the more exploited labor penalty fine leads to lower traffick labor 
investment. 
 
Figure 26.​ Effect of Funds on Labor Investment 
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We assume that the more funds fishermen have, the less exploited labor investments occur since 
they can order new ships, which will increase fish catch instead.  
From Figure 22, fraction of traffick labor investment and fraction of ship investment are 
rac Exploited Labor Investments Ef fect of  F unds on Labor InvF = ( +  
f fect of  Labor P rice on Labor Inv f fect of  Bust Cost on Labor InvE + E +  
f fect_of_Unlicensed_Ships_Ratio_on_Labor_Inv)/4E  
 rac Ship Investments rac Exploited Labor InvestmentsF = 1 − F  
- Upkeep Module 
 
Figure 27. ​Upkeep Module 
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In this module, the total upkeep is equal to the summation of ship operating costs (i.e. 
fuel and legal labor expenditures), licensed ship registration costs, and bust costs from law 
enforcement.  
The equation for the ship operating costs is shown below. 
otal Ship Upkeep otal F uel Cost otal Legal Labors Upkeep T otal Harbor CostT = T + T +   
Where, 
                                                          (13)otal F uel Cost uel Cost per Ship hips to SeaT = F * S  
                    (14)otal Legal Labors Upkeep egal Labors pkeep Cost per Legal LaborT = L * U  
otal Harbor Cost arbor Cost per Ship hips HarboredT = H * S                                       (15) 
The legal labors can be computed from  
                                                            (16)egal Labors abor Capacity xploited LaborsL = L − E  
The equation for licensed ship registration costs is written as 
                       (17)otal Registration Costs egistration Cost per Ship egistering ShipsT = R * R  
The equation for bust costs from law enforcement is expressed as 
                      (18)otal Bust Cost xploited Labor Bust Cost nlicensed Ship Bust CostT = E + U  
Where,  
              (19)xploited Labor Bust Cost ust Cost per Labor abors Released f rom BustE = B * L  
         (20)nlicensed Bust Cost nlicensed Bust Cost per Ship nlicensed Ships BustedU = U * U  
Note that is the amount of exploited labor that is captured byabors Released f rom BustL  
policy implementation.  
         (21)v Exploited Labor Bust Cost MT H1(Exploited Labor Bust Cost, Bust Delay)A = S   
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                       (22)v Unlicensed Bust Cost MT H1(Unlicensed Bust Cost, Bust Delay)A = S   
Where, SMTH1 calculates first-order exponential smooth of input. Basically, we can use 
SMTH1 to output the moving average of the input. In our model, average exploited labor and 
unlicensed bust costs are used in the Labors and Ships modules, which we have already 
explained.  
- Budget Module  
 
Figure 28. ​Budget Module 
Budget is the money that the government would spend on policy implementations. In this 
model, we assume that budget is distributed to three policies (Inspection Policy, Awareness 
Policy, and Rehabilitation Policy) based on their importance scales. The equations of the stocks 
and flows are represented below. 
                                                               (23)udget (Budget Received udget Spent) dtB = ∫
 
 
− B
                                                                 (23.1)udget Received ormal Budget ReceivedB = N  
udget Spent udget Spend on inspect udget Spend on RehabB = B + B  
                                                                                               (23.2)udget Spend on Aware+ B  
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Where,  
                        (23.2.1)udget Spend on inspect rac Budget on inspect P olicy udgetB = F * B  
                          (23.2.2)udget Spend on Aware rac Budget on Aware P olicy udgetB = F * B  
                          (23.2.3)udget Spend on Rehab rac Budget on Rehab P olicy udgetB = F * B  
(Note that Frac = fraction) 
The importance scales from 1 to 9 are adjustable scales. The input numbers demonstrate which 
policy will be more important than the others by calculating policies’ fractions. 
otal Importance Scale nspect P olicy Importance ScaleT = I +  
                               (24)ware P olicy Importance Scale ehab P olicy Importance ScaleA + R  
                                           (24.1)rac Budget on inspect P olicyF = T otal Importance Scale
Inspect P olicy Importance Scale  
                                            (24.2)rac Budget on Aware P olicy  F = T otal Importance Scale
Aware P olicy Importance Scale  
                                             (24.3)rac Budget on Rehab P olicyF = T otal Importance Scale
Rehab P olicy Importance Scale  
 
  
45 
- Policies Module 
 
Figure 29. ​Policies Module 
In the previous module, we described the distribution of the budget to each policy. In this 
module, we will focus on what these policies do. Let us first consider the awareness policy. This 
policy is to give knowledge to vulnerable workers, such that they will not be lured or want to be 
exploited labor. Therefore, a received budget for this policy determines how many vulnerable 
workers the government could give training. The effectiveness of this policy is described by the 
equation below. 
                                (25)wareness P olicy EffectivenessA = Budget Spend on AwareV ulnerable  Budget needed per V ulnerable*  
The inspection policy focus on the performance level of port authority inspection. In 
other words, the authority could hire more agents to monitor more fishing vessels for both 
unlicensed and licensed ships. In this model, we assume that the effectiveness of licensed ship 
inspection is two times the effectiveness of unlicensed ship inspection. Therefore, we set the 
Licensed Inspection Effectiveness converter to be 2.  
                      (26)ase inspection Effectiveness hips to SeaB = Budget Spend on inspectionBudget needed per Ship Inspection × S  
icensed Ships Busted ase inspection Effectiveness icensed Shipsl = B × L   
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                                                                               (26.1)icensed Inspection Effectiveness× L  
           (26.2)nlicensed Ships Busted ase inspection Effectiveness nlicensed ShipsU = B × U  
Note that Unlicensed Ships Busted is the number of unlicensed ships that is inspected while 
Licensed Ships Busted is the number of licensed ships that is inspected. 
The rehabilitation policy is to give vulnerable workers a legal occupation. Thus, this 
policy removes people from the Vulnerable stock directly. The equations of this action are 
written as 
                            (27)ehabilitation P olicy EffectivenessR = Budget Spend on RehabilitationNormal Budget on Rehabilitation P olicy  
Simulation 
After having a new system dynamics model, we set our model to the equilibrium points 
and assumed that this was Thai government action before Thailand was given a “yellow card” 
caution in 2015 by the EU. After that, we disturbed our model’s equilibrium by increasing the 
normal fish demand from 3,000 Tons to 3,300 Tons to observe an increase of illegal labor in the 
Thai fishing industry. Then, we will simulate the performance of strengthened law enforcement 
of the government of Thailand (after 2015) in response to the IUU fishing caution. Ultimately, 
we will adjust penalty fines in the system dynamics of the model to maintain the sustainable 
performance of all sectors, other than the illegal labor sector.  
- Policy Analysis 
Since we have already introduced 3 policies in the model description section, we will 
simulate the influence of each policy on the change in exploitation. 
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1. Awareness Policy 
 
Figure 30.​ Awareness Policy and Its Effects 
After disturbing an equilibrium by sliding up Awareness Policy Importance Scale, we see 
that exploited labors and vulnerable workers increase while the fish population is decreasing due 
to higher numbers of ships. Thus, focusing on this policy alone cannot reduce the amount of 
exploited labors. The sudden jump in profit shows that after disturbing the equilibrium, the 
Inspection Policy Importance Scale will be less effective since we have a fixed budget and we 
give more importance to the awareness policy.  
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2. Inspection Policy  
 
Figure 31.​ Inspection Policy and Its Effects 
After disturbing an equilibrium by sliding up Inspection Policy Importance Scale, we see 
that exploited labors reduce because the inspection policy is directly related to the exploited 
labors as described in the Policies Module. The increase in its importance scale means the 
increase in inspection effectiveness. As a consequence, the profit is going down. Thus, 
implementing this policy is a way to reduce exploited labor; however, the legislator still need to 
consider other factors, such that the implementation will not ruin the country’s economy.  
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3. Rehabilitation Policy 
 
Figure 32.​ Rehabilitation Policy and Its Effects 
Similar to the awareness policy in Figure 30, sliding up the Rehabilitation Importance 
Scale leads to an increase in exploited labors. However, the vulnerable workers decrease since 
the action of rehabilitation policy is to reduce vulnerable pools. Therefore, the implementation of 
both rehabilitation policy and inspection policy would reduce both exploited labors and 
vulnerable people.  
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- Law Enforcement  
 
Figure 33. ​Fish, Exploited Labors, Total Ships, and Profit at Equilibrium 
Figure 33 shows the equilibrium point of our model. Below, the disturbed graph that 
replicates Thai government action before receiving a yellow card is shown.  
 
Figure 34. ​Simulation of Weak Law Enforcement on Fishing Sector of Thailand 
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From Figure 34, we notice that exploited labor increases while the fish population 
decreases significantly. This shows the insufficient action of the government of Thailand on 
control and inspection of illegal activities and maintenance of the fish population. To meet the 
international standard, the Thai government has increased the effectiveness of inspection and 
adjusted the penalty fines of detected forced labor and unlicensed ships. The result of this action 
is shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 35.​ Effects of Strict Law Enforcement of Thai Government  
 From Figure 35, we see that the government meets success in reserving fish population in 
the sea and in decreasing exploited labor. Thus, the “yellow card” caution is now removed. 
However, Thai port authority has been receiving many petitions from Thai fishermen because 
their profits declined significantly and labor shortage has risen.  
Currently, fishermen want the government to give work authorization to illegal 
immigrants instead of sending them back to their countries (Thairath, 2018). On September82 th  
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2018, PRACHACHAT website announced that there are 10,743 legal fishing vessels in the 
national system. However, they also found approximately 800 hulks and abandoned ships, and 
that the government would destroy these ships on October 2018 (PRACHACHAT, 2018).1st  
According to these actions, we believe that many fishermen abandoned their ships to maintain 
their profits because of too strict policies. Recall that the total ships in our model cannot be 
decreased, so the profit from the simulation might be lower than reality. 
Thus, we want to examine the performance of policy implementation by reducing bust 
costs of exploited labor and unlicensed ships, such that the profit graph would not decline to the 
point of no return and fish population would not die out too fast. 
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- Result 
 
Figure 36.​ A Suggestion of Policy Promulgation 
From Figure 36, we notice that our examination can decrease illegal laborers from the 
fishing sector while increasing the profit is by 5 times the profit in Figure 35. Moreover, the fish 
population is still in a sustainable phase, such that the government has not had to control the 
maximum number of ships in the sea yet. However, there is also a trade-off since the decrease in 
illegal laborers is less than when using strict law implementation.  
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Figure 37.​ A Table Demonstrating the Actions of each Policy Promulgation 
Figure 37 shows the values of parameters that we adjusted during the simulation. We set other 
parameters to be the same as the default of the model is at equilibrium.  
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Conclusion 
 The extended model of a system dynamics approach to illegal fishing and trafficked labor 
includes the benefit of having exploited labor, which reduces operating cost per ship since 
fishermen do not have to pay for legal labor. The model also covers the fact that there are both 
licensed and unlicensed fishing vessels, which relate to the variations of trafficked labor in the 
system. Finally, the model simulates the effectiveness of policy promulgation on reducing illegal 
labors and sustaining other sectors. 
We found that the most effective policy is the inspection policy, which is directly related 
to the penalty fines of the detected unlicensed ship and trafficked labor. Simply put an increase in 
bust cost will reduce illegal activities. However, too aggressive bust costs in Thailand ruins other 
sectors such as fishermen profits because they do not have enough funds to pay for their upkeeps 
and new investments. These effects lead to the lack of labor in the fishing industry, which causes 
a sudden stop of economic growth. 
Therefore, reducing bust cost while maintaining the level of effectiveness for inspection 
policy would essentially be a way to sustain liquidity and economic growth. However, the 
number of traffick labor would not be decreased as much as it was when using strict law 
enforcement.  
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Part II. Fishy Bank Game 
According to our extended system dynamics model, we create the game interface, which 
allows players to act as Port Authority. The responsibilities of port authority are to to control, 
track, and maintain fish population and to take action on reducing the human-exploitation and 
other illegal activities in the fishing industry.  
Since this project mainly focuses on the human-exploitation in fishing industry, the 
winning criteria of the game is to have minimum exploited labor at the end of the game (i.e. 05 th
turn) while the player needs to make sure that the fish population and the average of fishermen 
profits are greater than the minimum thresholds. If one of the following variables is less than it 
minimum threshold, the game will be over. 
 
57 
- Setting of the Game 
 
Figure 38.​ Fishy Bank Game Interface 
In this game, players are allowed to make any changes on 7 parameters; Awareness 
Policy Importance Scale, Bust Policy Importance Scale, Rehability Important Scale, Unlicensed 
Bust Cost per Ship, Bust Cost per Exploited Labor, Consumer Tax rate, and Producer Tax rate.  
At the beginning of the game, the fish population is set to 30,000 and amount of exploited labor 
to 450. While playing the game if the ​fish population is less than 9,000​ (30% of the initial 
setting) ​or​ the ​profit is less than $1,000​, the ​game is over. 
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Figure 39.​ Fishy Bank Game Interface when Profit is too low 
Figure 39 shows an example that the game is over because the profit is of $787 which is 
less than $1,000.  
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Appendix  
Appendix A: Original System Dynamic Model by Saeed (2018) 
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Appendix B: Developed Model Parameters at Equilibrium  
Top-Level Model: 
Average_Expenditures(t) = Average_Expenditures(t - dt) + (Change_in_Av_Exp) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Average_Expenditures = 81000 
    UNITS: USD 
    INFLOWS: 
        Change_in_Av_Exp = ((Upkeep+Investments)-Average_Expenditures)/2 {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: US Dollars Per Year 
Average_Sale(t) = Average_Sale(t - dt) + (Change_in_Av_Sale) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Average_Sale = 3000 
    UNITS: fish 
    INFLOWS: 
        Change_in_Av_Sale = (Fish_Sale-Average_Sale)/2 {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: fish/year 
Budget(t) = Budget(t - dt) + (Budget_Recieved - Budget_Spent) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Budget = 200000 
    UNITS: USD 
    INFLOWS: 
        Budget_Recieved = Normal_Budget_Recieved {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: US Dollars Per Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Budget_Spent = 
Budget_Spend_on_Bust+Budget_Spend_on_Rehab+Budget_Spend_on_Aware {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: US Dollars Per Year 
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Debt(t) = Debt(t - dt) + (Borrow + Interest - Payment) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Debt = 0 
    UNITS: USD 
    INFLOWS: 
        Borrow = Total_Upkeep-Upkeep_Paid {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: USD/year 
        Interest = Debt*Interest_Rate {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: USD/year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Payment = SMTH1(Debt*Funds_Limit, Payment_Delay) {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: USD/year 
Exploited_Labor_Price_Index(t) = Exploited_Labor_Price_Index(t - dt) + 
(Change_in_Labor_Price) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Exploited_Labor_Price_Index = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
    INFLOWS: 
        Change_in_Labor_Price = 
Effect_of_Demand_on_Labor_Price*Exploited_Labor_Price_Index {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: Per Year 
Exploited_Labors(t) = Exploited_Labors(t - dt) + (Lure - Released_Labors - Attrition) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Exploited_Labors = 450 
    UNITS: person 
    INFLOWS: 
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        Lure = 
Unaware_Vunerable*Normal_Lure_Rate*Relative_Labor_Demand*Effect_of_Exploitation_Rati
o_on_Lure {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Released_Labors = Labors_Released_form_Contract_Ended+Labors_Released_from_Bust 
{UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
        Attrition = Frac_Attrition*Exploited_Labors {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
Fish(t) = Fish(t - dt) + (Fish_Hatch_Rate - Fish_Death_Rate - Total_Catch) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Fish = 30000 
    UNITS: fish 
    INFLOWS: 
        Fish_Hatch_Rate = (Fish*Frac_Hatch_rate)*Effect_of_Density_on_Hatching {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: fish/Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Fish_Death_Rate = (Fish*Frac_Death_rate)*Effect_of_Density_on_Death_rate 
{UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: fish/Year 
        Total_Catch = (Catch_per_Ship*Total_Ships) {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: fish/Year 
Fish_Inventory(t) = Fish_Inventory(t - dt) + (Fish_Catch - Fish_Sale) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Fish_Inventory = 3000 
    UNITS: fish 
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    INFLOWS: 
        Fish_Catch = Total_Catch {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: fish/Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Fish_Sale = 
(Normal_Fish_Demand*Fish_Demand_Elasticity*Inventory_Limit)+Fish_Demand_Noise*(RA
NDOM(-5, 5,5)) {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: fish/Year 
Fish_Price_Index(t) = Fish_Price_Index(t - dt) + (Change_in_Fish_Price) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Fish_Price_Index = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
    INFLOWS: 
        Change_in_Fish_Price = Fish_Price_Index*Fish_Price_Elasticity 
            UNITS: Per Year 
Funds(t) = Funds(t - dt) + (Net_Revenue - Investments - Upkeep - Debt_Paid) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Funds = 16000 
    UNITS: USD 
    INFLOWS: 
        Net_Revenue = Revenue*(1-Producer_Tax_rate) {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: USD/year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Investments = Total_Investment {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: USD/year 
        Upkeep = Upkeep_Paid {UNIFLOW} 
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            UNITS: USD/year 
        Debt_Paid = Payment {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: USD/year 
Licensed_Ships(t) = Licensed_Ships(t - dt) + (Ship_Registration - Ship_Contract_Ended) * dt 
{NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Licensed_Ships = 100 
    UNITS: ship 
    INFLOWS: 
        Ship_Registration = 
Effect_of_Bust_Cost_on_Regis*Normal_Regis_Rate*Unlicensed_Ships {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: ship/Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Ship_Contract_Ended = Licensed_Ships/Av_Length_of_Ship_Contract {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: ship/Year 
Unlicensed_Ships(t) = Unlicensed_Ships(t - dt) + (Ship_Production + Ship_Contract_Ended - 
Ship_Registration) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Unlicensed_Ships = 50 
    UNITS: ship 
    INFLOWS: 
        Ship_Production = DELAY3((Ship_Investment)/Ship_Price,Ship_Production_Delay) 
{UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: ship/Year 
        Ship_Contract_Ended = Licensed_Ships/Av_Length_of_Ship_Contract {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: ship/Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
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        Ship_Registration = 
Effect_of_Bust_Cost_on_Regis*Normal_Regis_Rate*Unlicensed_Ships {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: ship/Year 
Vulnerable(t) = Vulnerable(t - dt) + (Released_Labors + Vulnerable_Entry - Lure - 
Rehabilitated) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Vulnerable = 1000 
    UNITS: person 
    INFLOWS: 
        Released_Labors = Labors_Released_form_Contract_Ended+Labors_Released_from_Bust 
{UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
        Vulnerable_Entry = Normal_Vulnerable_Entry*Vulnerable_Attraction {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Lure = 
Unaware_Vunerable*Normal_Lure_Rate*Relative_Labor_Demand*Effect_of_Exploitation_Rati
o_on_Lure {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
        Rehabilitated = Normal_Frac_Rehab*Vulnerable*Rehab_Policy_Effectiveness 
{UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: person/Year 
Av_Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost = SMTH1(Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost,Bust_Delay) 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Av_Length_of_Labor_Contract = 90 
    UNITS: year 
Av_Length_of_Ship_Contract = 10 
    UNITS: year 
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Av_Unlicensed_Bust_Cost = SMTH1(Unlicensed_Bust_Cost,Bust_Delay) 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Aware_Policy_Importance_Scale = 2 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Awareness_Policy_Effectiveness = 
Budget_Spend_on_Aware/(Vulnerable*Budget_needed_per_Vulnerable) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Base_Bust_Effectiveness = 
(Budget_Spend_on_Bust/Budget_needed_per_Ship_Inspection)/Total_Ships 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Budget_needed_per_Ship_Inspection = 10000 
    UNITS: USD/ship/year 
Budget_needed_per_Vulnerable = 200 
    UNITS: USD/person/year 
Budget_Spend_on_Aware = Budget*Frac_Budget_on_Aware_Policy 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Budget_Spend_on_Bust = Frac_Budget_on_Bust_Policy*Budget 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Budget_Spend_on_Rehab = Frac_Budget_on_Rehab_Policy*Budget 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Bust_Cost_per_Labor = 280 
    UNITS: USD/person 
Bust_Delay = 2 
    UNITS: year 
Bust_Policy_Importance_Scale = 5 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Catch_per_Ship = Normal_Catch_per_Ship*Effect_of_Density_on_Catch 
    UNITS: fish/ship/year 
Consumer_Tax_rate = 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Desired_Funds = Average_Expenditures*Funds_Coverage 
    UNITS: USD 
Effect_of_Bust_Cost_on_Labor_Inv = GRAPH(Relative_Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost) 
(1.000, 1.000), (1.100, 0.987), (1.200, 0.965), (1.300, 0.929), (1.400, 0.885), (1.500, 0.810), 
(1.600, 0.712), (1.700, 0.584), (1.800, 0.389), (1.900, 0.195), (2.000, 0.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Bust_Cost_on_Regis = GRAPH(Relative_Unlicensed_Bust_Cost) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.200, 0.025), (0.400, 0.071), (0.600, 0.158), (0.800, 0.307), (1.000, 0.500), 
(1.200, 0.780), (1.400, 0.920), (1.600, 0.971), (1.800, 0.982), (2.000, 1.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Demand_on_Labor_Price = GRAPH(Relative_Labor_Demand) 
(0.000, -0.500), (0.200, -0.479), (0.400, -0.446), (0.600, -0.400), (0.800, -0.268), (1.000, 0.000), 
(1.200, 0.243), (1.400, 0.367), (1.600, 0.429), (1.800, 0.467), (2.000, 0.500) 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Effect_of_Density_on_Catch = GRAPH(Fish_Relative_Density) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.100, 0.150877192982), (0.200, 0.326315789474), (0.300, 0.536842105263), 
(0.400, 0.726315789474), (0.500, 0.845614035088), (0.600, 0.915789473684), (0.700, 
0.957894736842), (0.800, 0.996), (0.900, 1.000), (1.000, 1.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Density_on_Death_rate = GRAPH(Fish_Relative_Density) 
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(0.000, 0.000), (0.200, 0.0385964912281), (0.400, 0.112280701754), (0.600, 0.266666666667), 
(0.800, 0.571), (1.000, 1.000), (1.200, 1.55087719298), (1.400, 1.79649122807), (1.600, 
1.90175438596), (1.800, 1.969), (2.000, 1.98596491228) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Density_on_Hatching = GRAPH(Fish_Relative_Density) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.500, 0.531), (1.000, 1.000), (1.500, 1.398), (2.000, 1.551), (2.500, 1.459), 
(3.000, 1.133), (3.500, 0.592), (4.000, 0.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Exploitation_Ratio_on_Lure = GRAPH(Relative_Exploitation_Ratio) 
(0.000, 1.983), (0.200, 1.959), (0.400, 1.900), (0.600, 1.784), (0.800, 1.519), (1.000, 1.000), 
(1.200, 0.456), (1.400, 0.232), (1.600, 0.108), (1.800, 0.041), (2.000, 0.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Funds_on_Labor_Inv = GRAPH((Funds/Desired_Funds)) 
(0.000, 1.000), (0.200, 1.000), (0.400, 0.973), (0.600, 0.912), (0.800, 0.841), (1.000, 0.749), 
(1.200, 0.648), (1.400, 0.533), (1.600, 0.388), (1.800, 0.233), (2.000, 0.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Labor_Price_on_Labor_Inv = GRAPH(Exploited_Labor_Price_Index) 
(1.000, 1.000), (1.100, 0.987), (1.200, 0.965), (1.300, 0.929), (1.400, 0.885), (1.500, 0.810), 
(1.600, 0.712), (1.700, 0.584), (1.800, 0.389), (1.900, 0.195), (2.000, 0.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Unawareness_on_Vulnerable = 1-Awareness_Policy_Effectiveness 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Effect_of_Unlicensed_Ships_Ratio_on_Labor_Inv = GRAPH(Unlicensed_Ships_Ratio) 
(0.0000, 0.000), (0.0416666666667, 0.224), (0.0833333333333, 0.444), (0.1250, 0.577), 
(0.166666666667, 0.697), (0.208333333333, 0.788), (0.2500, 0.838), (0.291666666667, 0.876), 
(0.333333333333, 0.905), (0.3750, 0.934), (0.416666666667, 0.963), (0.458333333333, 0.983), 
(0.5000, 1.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
74 
Effective_Fish_Price_Index = Fish_Price_Index*(1+Consumer_Tax_rate) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost = Bust_Cost_per_Labor*Labors_Released_from_Bust 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Exploited_Labor_Demand = 
Exploited_Labor_Investment/(Exploited_Labor_Price_Index*Exploited_Labor_Normal_Cost) 
    UNITS: person/year 
Exploited_Labor_Investment = (Frac_Exploited_Labor_Investments*Funds) 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Exploited_Labor_Normal_Cost = 250 
    UNITS: USD/person 
Fish_Capacity = 60000 
    UNITS: fish 
Fish_Demand_Elasticity = GRAPH(Effective_Fish_Price_Index) 
(0.000, 4.000), (0.333333333333, 2.77464788732), (0.666666666667, 1.85915492958), (1.000, 
1.000), (1.33333333333, 0.718309859155), (1.66666666667, 0.478873239437), (2.000, 
0.338028169014), (2.33333333333, 0.225352112676), (2.66666666667, 0.142), (3.000, 0.106), 
(3.33333333333, 0.088), (3.66666666667, 0.053), (4.000, 0.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Fish_Demand_Noise = 0 
    UNITS: fish/year 
Fish_Normal_Density = .5 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Fish_Price_Elasticity = GRAPH(Fish_Inventory/Inventory_Goal) 
(0.000, 0.500), (0.500, 0.204225352113), (1.000, 0.000), (1.500, -0.221830985915), (2.000, 
-0.330985915493), (2.500, -0.390845070423), (3.000, -0.426056338028), (3.500, 
-0.454225352113), (4.000, -0.468309859155), (4.500, -0.485915492958), (5.000, -0.500) 
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    UNITS: Per Year 
Fish_Relative_Density = (Fish/Fish_Capacity)/Fish_Normal_Density 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Frac_Attrition = 0.02 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Frac_Budget_on_Aware_Policy = Aware_Policy_Importance_Scale/Total_Importance_Scale 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Frac_Budget_on_Bust_Policy = Bust_Policy_Importance_Scale/Total_Importance_Scale 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Frac_Budget_on_Rehab_Policy = Rehab_Policy_Importance_Scale/Total_Importance_Scale 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Frac_Death_rate = 0.1 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Frac_Exploited_Labor_Investments = 
(Effect_of_Funds_on_Labor_Inv+Effect_of_Labor_Price_on_Labor_Inv+Effect_of_Bust_Cost_
on_Labor_Inv+Effect_of_Unlicensed_Ships_Ratio_on_Labor_Inv)/4 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Frac_Hatch_rate = 0.2 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Frac_Ship_Investments = 1-Frac_Exploited_Labor_Investments 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Fuel_Cost_per_Ship = 100 
    UNITS: USD/ship/year 
Funds_Coverage = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
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Funds_Limit = GRAPH(Funds/Desired_Funds) 
(0.0000, 0.000), (0.0200, 0.304), (0.0400, 0.510), (0.0600, 0.676), (0.0800, 0.783), (0.1000, 
0.862), (0.1200, 0.917), (0.1400, 0.945), (0.1600, 0.980), (0.1800, 1.000), (0.2000, 1.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Interest_Rate = 0.05 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Inventory_Coverage = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Inventory_Goal = Average_Sale*Inventory_Coverage 
    UNITS: fish/year 
Inventory_Limit = GRAPH(Fish_Inventory/Inventory_Goal) 
(0.000, 0.000), (0.100, 0.204), (0.200, 0.416), (0.300, 0.633), (0.400, 0.774), (0.500, 0.850), 
(0.600, 0.907), (0.700, 0.947), (0.800, 0.965), (0.900, 0.982), (1.000, 1.000) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Labor_Capacity = Total_Ships*Labor_Capacity_per_Ship 
    UNITS: person 
Labor_Capacity_per_Ship = 10 
    UNITS: person/ship 
Labors_Released_form_Contract_Ended = Exploited_Labors/Av_Length_of_Labor_Contract 
    UNITS: person/year 
Labors_Released_from_Bust = 
((Licensed_Ships_Busted+Unlicensed_Ships_Busted)/Total_Ships)*Exploited_Labors 
    UNITS: person/year 
Legal_Labors = Labor_Capacity-Exploited_Labors 
    UNITS: person 
Licensed_Inspection_Effectiveness = 2 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Licensed_Ships_Busted = 
Base_Bust_Effectiveness*Licensed_Ships*Licensed_Inspection_Effectiveness 
    UNITS: ship/year 
Normal_Budget_on_Rehab_Policy = 60000 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Normal_Budget_Recieved = 200000 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Normal_Catch_per_Ship = 20 
    UNITS: fish/ship/year 
Normal_Exploitation_Ratio = 0.3 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Normal_Fish_Demand = 3000 
    UNITS: fish/year 
Normal_Fish_Price = 27 
    UNITS: USD/fish 
Normal_Frac_Rehab = 0.03 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Normal_Labor_Demand = 64 
    UNITS: person/year 
Normal_Lure_Rate = 0.08 
    UNITS: Per Year 
Normal_Regis_Rate = 0.4 
    UNITS: per year 
Normal_Vulnerable_Entry = 39 
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    UNITS: person/year 
Payment_Delay = 10 
    UNITS: year 
Producer_Tax_rate = 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Regis_Cost_per_Ship = 1000 
    UNITS: USD/ship 
Rehab_Policy_Effectiveness = Budget_Spend_on_Rehab/Normal_Budget_on_Rehab_Policy 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Rehab_Policy_Importance_Scale = 3 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Relative_Exploitation_Ratio = (Exploited_Labors/Labor_Capacity)/Normal_Exploitation_Ratio 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Relative_Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost = 
Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost/Av_Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Relative_Labor_Demand = Exploited_Labor_Demand/Normal_Labor_Demand 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Relative_Unlicensed_Bust_Cost = Unlicensed_Bust_Cost/Av_Unlicensed_Bust_Cost 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Revenue = Fish_Sale*Effective_Fish_Price_Index*Normal_Fish_Price 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Ship_Investment = Funds*Frac_Ship_Investments 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Ship_Price = 2000 
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    UNITS: USD/ship 
Ship_Production_Delay = 0 
    UNITS: year 
Total_Bust_Cost = Unlicensed_Bust_Cost+Exploited_Labor_Bust_Cost 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Total_Fuel_Cost = Fuel_Cost_per_Ship*Total_Ships 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Total_Importance_Scale = 
Bust_Policy_Importance_Scale+Aware_Policy_Importance_Scale+Rehab_Policy_Importance_S
cale 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Total_Investment = Exploited_Labor_Investment+Ship_Investment 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Total_Legal_Labors_Upkeep = Legal_Labors*Upkeep_Cost_per_Legal_Labor 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Total_Regis_Cost = Regis_Cost_per_Ship*Ship_Registration 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Total_Ship_Upkeep = Total_Fuel_Cost+Total_Legal_Labors_Upkeep 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Total_Ships = Unlicensed_Ships+Licensed_Ships 
    UNITS: ship 
Total_Upkeep = (Total_Bust_Cost+Total_Ship_Upkeep+Total_Regis_Cost) 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Unaware_Vunerable = Vulnerable*Effect_of_Unawareness_on_Vulnerable 
    UNITS: person 
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Unlicensed_Bust_Cost = Unlicensed_Bust_Cost_per_Ship*Unlicensed_Ships_Busted 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Unlicensed_Bust_Cost_per_Ship = 1500 
    UNITS: USD/ship 
Unlicensed_Ships_Busted = Base_Bust_Effectiveness*Unlicensed_Ships 
    UNITS: ship/year 
Unlicensed_Ships_Ratio = Unlicensed_Ships/Licensed_Ships 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Upkeep_Cost_per_Legal_Labor = 20 
    UNITS: USD/person/year 
Upkeep_Paid = Total_Upkeep*Funds_Limit 
    UNITS: USD/year 
Vulnerable_Attraction = SMTH1(Exploited_Labor_Price_Index, 10) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
{ The model has 142 (142) variables (array expansion in parens). 
  In root model and 0 additional modules with 11 sectors. 
  Stocks: 13 (13) Flows: 26 (26) Converters: 103 (103) 
  Constants: 41 (41) Equations: 88 (88) Graphicals: 14 (14) 
  There are also 31 expanded macro variables. 
  } 
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Appendix C: Fishy Bank Game Instruction 
Fishy Bank Game 
 
By Wai Khumwang and Palawat Busaranuvong 
Advisor: Dr. Khalid Saeed 
Overview 
Thailand is well-known as the third-largest seafood exporter in the world. However, in 
April 2015, the European Union gave Thailand a “yellow card” caution and listed it among 
countries that have insufficient action of progress in tackling illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing (IUU). If Thai government does not take full action to overcome the IUU Fishing issue, 
the European Union will give it a “red card”, which would ban the export of all seafood-products 
from the Thai fishing industry to the European Union.  
To respond to the yellow card, the government of Thailand has strengthened law 
enforcement to control, patrol, and track activities in the national fishing fleet. First, Thai Port 
Authority has increased the seriousness of ship inspections, which drove fishermen to register 
their ships into the tracking system. Second, employers who hire foreigners/immigrants without 
work authorization will be forced to pay a penalty. The legislation has shown an effort of the 
government of Thailand and the improvement of anti-human trafficking.  
After strengthening law enforcement, the Thai fishing sector has met the international 
standard; however a new problem has arisen. Since the penalty of having illegal labor from the 
mentioned legislation is very high, it has led to fishing labor shortage, which has raised cost of 
fishing, making it less competitive in the export market. 
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Objective and Winning Criteria 
Since there is still a trade-off between fishermen profits and exploited labors, Can you 
come up with a better policy implementation to ​reduce exploited labors​ while ​maintaining the 
profit​ to be higher than minimum expected value? 
Initial Settings​: Fish 30k, Profit $16k, and Exploited Labor 450 
Game Play: 
- Run the game for 50 turns and maintain the profit and fish population. The game will be 
over before the 50th turn under 2 constraints 
→ The number of fish is lower than 9,000 ​or​ the profit is lower than $1,000 
- The winner of the game is the team that has a minimum exploited labors at the end of the 
 turn (year).05 th   
- If there is more than 1 team that has the same amount of exploited labors at the end of the 
game, then the team that maintains higher profit will win. 
 
Game Inputs/Decisions 
The following inputs can be modified at the beginning of each Turn. 
Awareness Policy Importance Scale 
● Give knowledge to vulnerable workers 
● Range: 1 to 9 
● Considerations:  
○ More money in Awareness Policy will decrease the number of vulnerable people 
that became exploited labors. 
○ Budget pool is fixed, so increasing in Awareness Policy Importance Scale will 
decrease the money given to other policies. 
Inspection Policy Importance Scale 
● Determine ​performance level of port authority inspection 
● Range: 1 to 9 
● Considerations:  
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○ More money in Inspection Policy will increase the number of ships being 
inspected and busted, lead to more exploited labors being released and became 
vulnerable people. 
○ Budget pool is fixed, so increasing in Inspection Policy Importance Scale will 
decrease the money given to other policies. 
Rehabilitation Policy Important Scale 
● G​ive vulnerable workers a legal occupation. 
● Range: 1 to 9 
● Considerations:  
○ More money in Rehabilitation Policy will decrease the number of vulnerable 
people from the game. 
○ Budget pool is fixed, so increasing in Rehabilitation Policy Importance Scale will 
decrease the money given to other policies. 
Unlicensed Bust Cost per Ship 
● Penalty of inspected unlicensed ships 
● Range: $1,000 to $10,000 
● Considerations: 
○ Higher unlicensed bust cost will encourage the fishermen to register the license 
for more ships. 
○ However, higher bust cost will decrease profit. 
Bust Cost per Exploited Labor 
● Penalty of detected exploited labors 
● Range: $100 to $2,000 
● Considerations: 
○ Higher exploited labor bust cost will encourage the fishermen to have less 
exploited labors. 
○ However, higher bust cost will decrease profit. 
Producer Tax Rate 
● Fish catching tax that fishermen must pay 
● Range: 0 (0%) to 0.25 (25%) 
● Considerations: 
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○ Higher producer tax rate will decrease profit and limit the growth of ship fleet, 
thus limit the decreasing rate of fish. 
Consumer Tax Rate 
● Tax of fish price in market 
● Range: 0 (0%) to 0.25 (25%) 
● Considerations: 
○ Higher consumer tax rate will increase fish price and affect fish demand. 
 
Outputs/Decision Factors 
Fish ​ → Remaining fish population 
Total Catch​ → Total caught fish  
Fish Price​ → Price of fish in market 
Exploited Labors → ​Trafficked labor; having them will reduce operating cost. 
Legal Labors → ​Receive payment from fisherman and work legally. .  
Total Ships​ → Unlicensed ships + Licensed Ships 
Unlicensed Ship Percentage 
Profit​ → Yearly profit in U.S. dollar 
Vulnerable People ​→ workers whom can be lured to be exploited labor 
 
Game Rules 
1.​      ​Teams 
●  ​Attendees will form 5 teams of approximately 5 members each. 
●  ​Teams will make strategic decisions collectively. 
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●  ​Each team will be provided with a technical facilitator to help them input decisions into 
the game interface and explain outcomes. 
2.​      ​Inputs 
●  ​Teams can start deliberating when the Game Master starts the game. The result of each 
deliberation is a policy that will be in place for one year. The simulation will stop after 
one year, calling for another round of deliberations for next year’s policy. 
●  ​Changes cannot be made once the Game Master has ended the game. 
● The Game Master is available for any questions regarding the model. Game Master and 
facilitators will not offer any recommendations regarding strategy. 
3.​      ​Competition 
● Each team can make an unlimited number of simulation runs to try different strategies. 
● The winner of the game is the team that has a minimum exploited labors at the end of the 
 turn (year). If there is more than 1 team that has the same amount of exploited05 th  
labors at the end of the game, then the team that maintains higher profit will win. 
● The Game Master reserves the right to invalidate strategies that can only win based on 
bugs in the game. 
4.​      ​Cross Team Communication 
● Team members are not allowed to discuss strategy with other teams. 
●  ​At the 30 and 45 minute marks, the best result from each team will be posted. 
 
 
 
